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Reclaiming the streets
Black urban insurgency and antisocial security
in twenty-first-century Philadelphia
Jeff Maskovsky

Abstract: This article focuses on the emergence of a new pattern of black urban
insurgency emerging in major US metropolitan areas such as Philadelphia. I locate this pattern in the context of a new securitization regime that I call “antisocial security.” This regime works by establishing a decentered system of high-tech
forms of surveillance and monitory techniques. I highlight the dialectic between
the extension of antisocial security apparatuses and techniques into new political
and social domains on the one hand and the adoption of these same techniques
by those contesting racialized exclusions from urban public space on the other. I
end the article with a discussion of how we might adapt the commons concept to
consider the centrality of race and racism to this new securitization regime.
Keywords: commoning, inner city, race, securitization, United States, urban politics

In Philadelphia, on 10 April 2013, dozens of African American youth converged in what municipal authorities described as a “flash mob” at
the heart of the city’s central business district.
Called together with the use of social media,
these young people blocked traffic, massed on
street corners, and ran down several city blocks
until they were dispersed by the local police.
Dozens of flash mobs, some involving hundreds
of African American teens, took place in Philadelphia from 2009 to 2016.1 In response, politicians and police officials held press conferences
during which they condemned participants for
vandalizing property, shoplifting, disrupting
commerce, and violence. The local TV news

broadcast sensationalized reports about “crazed
teens,” “mob violence,” and “youth rioting.”
In 2011, Philadelphia mayor Michael Nutter
(2008–2016) criticized African American teens
for participating in unruly gatherings in public
spaces. From the pulpit of Mount Carmel Baptist Church in West Philadelphia, where he is
a member, he scolded: “You’ve damaged yourself, you’ve damaged another person, you’ve
damaged your peers and, quite honestly, you’ve
damaged your own race” (quoted in John-Hall
2011). In 2010, then City Council member Jim
Kenney described the disruption caused by a
gathering of African American teens as an act
of “urban terrorism” (quoted in Owens 2017).
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Nutter signed legislation stepping up police enforcement of teen curfews, while Kenney called
for aggressive “zero tolerance” policing and
steeper punishments for unruly teens. Kenney
succeeded Nutter as mayor of Philadelphia in
2016.
I begin with this example of a moral panic
over African American teen “flash mobs” to open
a discussion of race, insurgent politics, and securitization in Philadelphia. Broadly speaking,
I am interested in how urban elites understand
and enact security over public spaces, the struggles that ensue when subordinated groups seek
to occupy and reclaim public spaces in ways that
disrupt and unsettle elite plans for their use, and
how race politics shape these dynamics. More
specifically, I am interested in the intersection
of race, insurgent politics, and securitization in
Philadelphia during the period from 2008 to
2016 of what Jamie Peck (2012) calls “austerity
urbanism.” In a context characterized by lean
municipal government, new reductions in social-service delivery, reduced fiscal capacity, and
austerity politics, the disruptive actions taken by
African American youth are best understood, I
argue, as an effort to reclaim urban public space,
albeit fleetingly, for those who have been labeled
as “undesirable,” “pathological,” or a “threat” to
Philadelphia’s future and who have thus been
targeted by the city’s policing, surveillance, and
legal apparatuses.
In contrast to both popular and political
discourses that emphasize black youth gatherings as antisocial criminal conduct, or that
treat them as apolitical, I argue that they are a
form of black urban insurgency. In Philadelphia
and elsewhere, we have seen a recent uptick in
acts of protest against the spatialized instantiation of antiblack racism and violence, including, of course, Black Lives Matter (BLM) and
the Movement for Black Lives (MBL) (Camp
and Heatherton 2016; Williams 2015; on race,
place and space, see Brown 2009; Gregory 1998;
Lipsitz 2007; Maskovsky 2006). Indeed, if “teen
flash mobs” are a fiction told by municipal elites
and their supporters to obscure the spatialized
effects of large-scale political economic change

on urban African Americans (Massaro and
Mullany 2011), then “turbulent crowd actions”
involving African American teens should be
understood, I think, as part of a broader protest
landscape that is revolting against these arrangements.2 Christian Ducomb and Jessica Benmen
(2014) coin the term “turbulent crowd action”
in an article that applies Latour’s actor-network
theory to flash mob performances and that emphasizes both the historical continuities of contemporary actions with those from the past and
the contingencies that shape crowd action; in
contrast, I use the term to emphasize its nascent
political potentialities for the present.
Central to this perspective is my framing of
these actions also as a response in part to the
rise of a new urban securitization and surveillance regime that I call the regime of antisocial
security. This regime is grafting onto the racialized urban post-welfarism and the carceral
turn of the late twentieth century a decentered
surveillance and security system comprised
of high-tech monitory procedures and hyperspecific forms of mediatized surveillance. Antisocial security is oriented not so much to
maintain social order by segregation or fortification but rather to surveil and police parts of
the city—its downtown commercial districts
mostly—that are difficult to secure. These are
public spaces where the daily flow of people
makes fortification, citadelization, or ghettoization logistically or politically difficult in a postindustrial context in which commercial activity
dominates the urban core (cf. Marcuse 1998).
What has emerged in these spaces, then, is a
nimble form of securitization and surveillance
that seeks to identify threats in racially diverse
and socially inclusive spaces without impeding
the movement and mobility of the people who
are inhabiting them. At the same time, antisocial
security also must work almost paradoxically to
privilege elite groups of shoppers, workers, and
residents; to racialize public space; and to subjugate urban African Americans and other people
of color. This article sheds light on this paradox.
It builds on scholarship on insurgency (Holston
2009; Murphy 2015) and on securitization and
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urban public space (Hall 1978; Holdbraad and
Pedersen 2013; Low 2017; Low and Smith 2006;
Maguire et al. 2014; Mitchell 2014) to explore
the unique political and governmental challenges that antisocial security poses for urban
African Americans on the one hand and the
new forms of racial politics that contest its instantiation and extension into new geographical
and institutional spaces on the other hand.
I focus on three related issues. First, I discuss in more detail what I mean by the regime
of antisocial security and highlight how I see it
reshaping the US urban core and its racial geography, with Philadelphia serving as my primary
example. Second, I analyze the new pattern of
black urban insurgency and street protest that
I see on the political horizon. In my discussion
of insurgency, I bring into focus the “commoning” of parts of the new security apparatus as an
essential aspect of attempts to resist new forms
of racialized cultural, material, and spatial enclosure (Ecologist 1993; Nonini 2007; Susser and
Tonnelat 2013). I end the article with a critical
discussion of the commons concept as an antiracist emancipatory rubric given the implications of the new securitization regime. I draw on
ethnographic and historical evidence gathered
through long-term fieldwork conducted intermittently in Philadelphia on race, class, civic life,
and economic revitalization from 2000 to 2017
to explore the intersection of race, insurgency,
and securitization.3 An ethnographic investigation of residents’ discourses and practices of
insurgent politics and security illuminates the
complexity of new power relations and political
and governing imaginaries that are reshaping
the urban core in cities like Philadelphia.

Antisocial security: A new form
of urban security
In Philadelphia and other major metropolitan
areas in the United States and elsewhere, racialized policing practices are central to the ordering of public urban spaces and have long been
intimately linked to the ordering functions of

urban revitalization policies, commercial districts, and neighborhood “quality of life” programs.4 Scholars in anthropology, geography,
and other related fields tend to tie these developments closely to the rise of urban neoliberalism (Low and Smith 2006; Maskovsky 2006)
and to the integration, post-9/11, of more coercive, militarized policing and surveillance
techniques into urban securitization schemes
(Maskovsky and Cunningham 2009; Ruben
and Maskovsky 2008; for a non-US example,
see Goldstein 2010). Along these lines, in “The
War on Teenage Terrorists: Philly’s ‘Flash Mob
Riots’ and the Banality of Post-9/11 Securitization,” feminist geographers Vanessa A. Massaro
and Emma Gaalaas Mullaney (2011) describe
the crackdown on public gatherings of African
American youth in Philadelphia’s commercial
districts as part of a wider pattern of post-9/11
antiterrorist securitization, which they see as
supporting the militarized enforcement of spatial segregation and the defense of spaces for
neoliberal capitalist development and commercial consumption.5 By calling it banal, they are
drawing on Cindi Katz’s notion of banal terrorism, which, she writes, “embraces a theme
about ‘us’—‘we’ are ‘threatened,’ ‘they’ hate/are
jealous of ‘us,’ ‘we’ share a ‘homeland’—but it
goes a step further as these notions about ‘us’
authorize and propel a common sense notion
of ‘them’ as threat” (2007: 351). Broadening the
critique of neoliberalism to include attention to
the banality of illiberal measures that have been
successively introduced from the War on Drugs
to the War on Terror tells us a great deal about
how fear of crime and of the disorderly street
surface to justify and legitimate draconian policing practices, the extension of urban security
and surveillance apparatuses into new domains,
the crackdown on public space, and the continued reinforcement of spatial segregation in the
urban core more broadly, and in Philadelphia
in particular with its long history of militarized
police violence targeting African Americans
(see, e.g., Massiah and Cade Bambara 2006).
I wish to extend this analysis by arguing that
this ad hoc system of urban securitization and
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surveillance is also enhanced by a system of
“continuous control.” This is a formulation, first
elaborated by Gilles Deleuze in 1992 in “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” in which
people’s movements, ideas, spending, and habits are tracked and monitored by “ultrarapid
forms of free-floating control” (1992: 4). Roger
Lancaster (2017), following Thomas Mathiesen
(1997; see also Mathiesen 2013) calls this new
regime of power “synopticism,” a variation on
the modern disciplinary regime described by
Michel Foucault that was inspired famously by
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon.6 If panopticism
is characterized in the disciplinary societies of
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries by the organization of vast spaces of enclosure into factories, schools, families, hospitals,
and prisons, synopticism is a form of power in
which these disciplinary enclosures are crisscrossed by “plural techniques” of surveillance
that differentiate individuals from each other,
sort people into categories of productive and
unproductive personhood, and, importantly,
single out pariahs who should be punished for
violating aesthetic and moral principles that are
difficult to discern and unevenly applied. Unlike
the carceral state, synopticism relies less on excessive punishment and militarized control and
more on social media, texting, online search
engines, electronic toll collection systems, cell
phones, airport security screenings, body cameras, fitness trackers, antimalware software, street
cameras, and other seemingly benign forms of
surveillance.
The idea of a system of antisocial security
rooted in synopticism is useful because it offers
an important corrective to more celebratory
accounts of the wave of prison reform that has
recently taken place across the United States,
from the repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws
in New York State (which inaugurated the contemporary period of post–civil rights era mass
incarceration in 1973) to new kinds of experimentation around prison reentry and other
reforms that have moved criminal justice policy in less punitive directions during Barack
Obama’s administration. Far from establishing

a return to a more benevolent, rehabilitative,
and less racist form of social control, I see the
situation instead as one in which the system
of surveillance is now so dense and so expansive that incarceration, citadelization, containment, and ghettoization becomes less crucial to
social control. To be sure, the existence of the
carceral state that has penalized racialized poverty and established an expansive criminal justice and prison system to warehouse the black
poor is undeniable, as is the exercise of coercive
control over the urban core across the United
States (Wacquant 2009). These trends are not
disappearing anytime soon, as is evidenced, for
example, by the immediate reversal of Obamaera criminal justice reforms and the embrace of
law and order policies by Donald Trump’s administration. But surveillance capacities have
become so sophisticated that different kinds
of individuals can now be tracked, managed,
sorted, and, if necessary, criminalized or, at the
very least, targeted for public humiliation and
ridicule. Among the new pariahs are flash mob
teens, sexual predators, teen sexters, suburban
heroin addicts, goths and gamers turned possible school shooters, deluded ISIS sympathizers,
and so on. There is, of course, nothing unprecedented about moral panics over racialized and
gender non-normative wayward youth and
other pathologized threats. But the speed with
which we move from one potentially threatening group to another, the level of detail we see
streaming across our desks daily about the kinds
of people who represent a new social threat, and
the extent to which we invest in parsing out who
is and who is not a threat and a social pariah
is new, if not wholly unprecedented. And the
kind of surveillance that allows this new threat
matrix to become visible is profoundly antisocial, in the sense that it is unconcerned with the
questions of social cohesion and normalization
and concerned instead with identifying, animating, and proliferating heterogeneous subjectivities whose relationships to a larger social whole
are largely irrelevant to the new hegemonic order. This articulation is concerned not with the
social whole or the body politic but rather with
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newer, more fleeting and exclusive assemblages
of people, positions, and practices.7
Importantly, the system of continuous control
that I describe here is by no means color-blind.
Although it is not invested in maintaining the
same kind of disciplinary control over black
bodies that arose as a central feature of nineteenth- and twentieth-century panopticism, the
instruments of surveillance that have coalesced
into a system of continuous control were in
many respects invented and honed through
the historical effort to assert control over black
bodies and neighborhoods, from slavery to Jim
Crow to the post–civil rights era War on Drugs
and mass incarceration. They are therefore best
understood as a refined set of surveillance instruments that are capable of sorting people in
ways that reinforce racialized hierarchies and
antiblack social and political prerogatives rather
than as a system organized around color-blind
cultural or political logics.
On the urban scale, in the United States and
elsewhere, the surveillance technologies of the
security state are increasingly integrated with
those used in commerce and leisure spheres,
creating a new multidirectional patterning of
surveillance within and across urban enclosures.
Corporate security forces have long cooperated
with the police, and often act independently as
well. The US government’s capacity to spy on
Facebook accounts or read text messages or
listen to telephone conversations has certainly
generated a great deal of controversy. But it is
only a small part of a broader, more expansive
surveillance system that goes in all sorts of directions so that the US government’s spying
efforts are linked in some ways to big data information-gathering techniques used by social
media and technology firms. But, as anyone
who uses Facebook knows, we are also spying
on each other, on the government, and on technology companies. Deleuze argues that in the
society of control, the primary mechanism of
control is modulation, not enclosure. In this situation, controls are “like a self-deforming cast
that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh

will transmute from point to point” (1992: 4).
This is precisely the kind of surveillance we have
seen taking hold in Philadelphia’s downtown
commercial corridors. In addition to imposing
a curfew on teenagers, Philadelphia police also
began monitoring social media and friending
youth on Facebook and Twitter. They ramped
up the police presence at downtown intersections and forged a private sector partnership
with commercial business owners, who were
asked to notify the police if teens gather. The
Philadelphia Police Department has also used
“swarm” policing, a tactic borrowed from the
military of advancing from every direction on
a suspect or group of suspects, who are, in this
case, teens congregating in a public space (Jervis 2011). Taken together, these measures suture
together a dense web of surveillance and security activities that do not help to constitute a
fortified elite enclosure. Rather, they enable the
commercial zones to remain porous and open
even as they are densely surveilled synoptically.
Major shifts in the US political economy
since the 1980s have shaped the pattern of antisocial securitization affecting cities like Philadelphia. In the urban United States, the rise of
the new synoptic capacities that commerce and
technology have enabled is linked closely with
aspects of a new pattern of racialized capitalist socialization and authoritarian rule that has
fragmented social and political alliances within
and across the boundaries of race, class, gender,
sexuality, and nationality. And it is precisely the
situation of extreme economic inequality and
political polarization and disaffection that creates the condition in which continuous control,
enacted horizontally as much as vertically, can
flourish.
At the level of political economy, a central
feature of these antisocial articulations is the
form of capitalist political economy since the
1980s that is frequently glossed as neoliberalism but, as Gavin Smith argues, is better understood as a shift in the dominance of forms
of capital from production to finance.8 Smith
explains that the dominant class blocs in the period dominated by finance capital have pursued
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what he calls “selective hegemony,” which “restricts the field of negotiable politics to selected
participants, so there is a sphere of action beyond such politics where no such negotiation is
possible” (2011: 4–5). Outside of this restricted
field is an “absolute residual population” whose
only recourse is counter-politics—the attempt
to dismantle dominative and hegemonic power,
not to negotiate with capital. The efforts of Wall
Street to control economic growth and governance introduced higher levels of volatility and
crisis into the economy, requiring state-coordinated upward wealth transfer repeatedly since
the 1970s. The 2008 housing market meltdown
is certainly the most exaggerated moment to
date in this prolonged crisis—and the most blatant bank rescue—but it follows on the heels
of the collapse in the 1990s of the technology
boom, the 1980s savings and loan disaster, and
the two oil crises of the 1970s. Each of these crisis moments combined with a sustained push to
weaken labor power at the hands of capital and
to require the economic sacrifice of major fractions of the middle- and lower-classes at the altar
of finance capital. And the new demographics
of economic inequality and poverty that have
accompanied these developments are now well
documented, as are the new patterns of uneven
urban development and of investment and disinvestment in the urban core (Smith 2011).9
This contrasts with a prior period of expansive
hegemony during which different populations
were able to extract concessions by negotiating
with capital for a stake in the political economy.
There is an inside/outside dynamic at play here
in which finance-driven, profit-making mechanisms and instruments are at once extremely
complex and uncoordinated yet unified by an
elementary logic of expulsion (Sassen 2014).10
Extending this idea to capitalist racialization,
we could also say that the current purportedly
postracial period is marked by a parallel shift
that is more selective than expansive, in the
sense that a white elite is less concerned with
securing the social order by maintaining a stable albeit hierarchalized racial order than it is in
using race politics narrowly and strategically to

disrupt challenges to its control. The leaders of
finance are hostile to racial justice—they were
brazenly predatory on black and Latinx communities in the United States in the lead-up to
the 2008 housing market collapse (Crump et
al. 2008)—more so perhaps than other sectors
of capital, while they were perfectly willing to
engage in profit-making schemes that devalued
labor on a global scale, including that of white
industrial workers in the metropolitan centers
of the global north. Finance tends to oscillate
between corporate multiculturalism and color
blindness with a cavalier indifference. The abandonment of large segments of the white middle
and working classes is fine in this situation of
selective hegemony in the United States, but so
too is a white racial project of enforcing financialized precarity on people of color.
One obvious consequence of the exercise of
finance-led selective hegemony is an increasingly large absolute surplus population sorted
into new fragmented and hierarchalized groups
within the general category of the expelled, and
a growing group who are trying desperately to
hang on and prevent their own expulsion. Importantly, expulsion and precaritization are
not in themselves politically unifying developments. It is certainly useful to consider what is
happening to, say, home mortgage defaulters in
Florida and Arizona; the chronically underemployed remnants of the once “affluent” white
working class in Youngstown, Ohio; homeless
people in San Francisco; Flint, Michigan, residents poisoned by privatized water systems;
undocumented laborers who are rounded up
and deported in Chicago; African Americans
harassed and murdered by police in Baltimore,
Ferguson (Missouri), and New York City; students of color in Philadelphia’s funding-starved
schools; sick and injured farm animals in the
Midwest. Or, to think beyond methodological
nationalism and consider what is happening
to migrant workers in the Americas or refugees from the Middle East, as part of a global
population of displaced, evicted, and dislocated
people, cast out of professional livelihood, living space, and even from life itself. However,
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we cannot assume that this massive social, economic, and political dislocation will catalyze
mass counter-politics. On the liberal Left in
the United States, the hollowing out of an expansive hegemony into which disenfranchised
groups could fight for entry and its replacement
by selective hegemony, including the growth of
an “absolute surplus population,” abandoned by
capital and the state, has led some to argue for
a new class universalism, an alignment of the
ranks of disposable people in a new movement
from below (Brecher et al. 2000; Frank 2004).
The liberal-left criticism of “identity politics”
gained traction after Trump’s narrow electoral
victory in November 2016. This entailed a push
for a platform of economic populism that is disdainful of cultural radicalism, which is viewed
at best as a troublesome diversion from a new
working-class politics and as thus a factor contributing to the rise of economic inequality
(see, e.g., the widely influential New York Times
op-ed by Mark Lilla [2016]).
But the liberal Left desire for class solidarity
ignores, of course, the concrete realities of race,
gender, sexual, class, and national politics. It
ignores religious and geographical differences
within this expanding “absolute residual population.” It ignores the long, sordid history of
white supremacy in which whites who shared
economic interests with people of color sacrificed them to their religious, national, or racial
interests. And it ignores the extent to which
inequalities across race, gender, class, sexuality, and nationality produce unequal power
relation within the new disposable population,
which is itself comprised of groups with distinct
histories, grievances, and political sensibilities
and sentiments. In other words, even as the
disposable population expands, some people
are still treated as—and feel—more disposable
than others. In the United States, the rise of the
Tea Party alongside the rise of BLM, Occupy
Wall Street (OWS), and the immigrants’ rights
movement—each with its own political repertoires and priorities and each with its own social bases—suggests that tensions and divisions
within the disposable population of the United

States are just as likely to intensify as the precarious classes are likely to unite across differences
and inequalities. In many ways, the political
ascension of Donald Trump also complicates
this picture, creating new political challenges
for low-income people and people of color in
general, but especially for those living in urban areas such as Philadelphia. Urban African
Americans in Philadelphia and in other major
metropolitan areas hold long-felt grievances
against the liberal urban governing coalitions
that are expert at reproducing political inequality along racial lines. Yet they have had little
choice since the 1960s but to cast their lot with
contemporary municipal elites. This dynamic
intensified with Trump’s electoral victory. The
elitist politics of the municipal elite’s embrace
of austerity urbanism are frequently elided by
Trump’s vilification of the cosmopolitan elite
and by his opponents’ valorization of municipal
areas as enlightened zones of liberal cosmopolitanism, about which I will say more below.
Unsurprisingly, a long-term crisis in political
authority and legitimacy accompanies the rise
of selective hegemony, and US political elites
have had difficulty asserting a coherent strategy
of rule even as the forces of reaction and authoritarianism have grown since the 1980s. The
authoritarian turn in the United States has been
decades in the making. It should be remembered that one of the most astute observations
by Stuart Hall and his colleagues (1978) in Policing the Crisis is that Thatcherite authoritarian
populism emerged in a context of a prolonged
and intensifying crisis of legitimacy of the
postwar Labour-led governing coalition in the
United Kingdom. In the United States, the crisis of legitimacy plaguing the Democratic Party
since the collapse of the New Deal has followed
a similar path, and the politics of fear and reaction—and of sentimentality more generally—
have filled the political void, even as they have
garnered few fully committed supporters.
In this situation, the centrality of antiblackness and nativism to the new authoritarianism’s
popular appeal is unsurprising. The authoritarian projects that gain political traction in the
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contemporary United States, like that of Trump,
do so precisely because they are designed to address questions of wealth distribution and social
and economic mobility by inflaming xenophobic
and nativist passions and by discrediting black
and brown political authority and accomplishment (Maskovsky 2017). Yet everyday refusals to
submit to political authority or to acknowledge
the legitimacy of political elites are commonplace in Philadelphia and elsewhere, as diverse
factions of the US urban pubic disengage from
the political system, rage against Washington
and sometimes against the indignities of state
surveillance programs, and lampoon political
authorities. In Philadelphia and elsewhere, the
rise of the regime of antisocial security, with its
selective hegemony and authoritarian dimensions, may seem on the surface to disable antiracist politics. But it also created new grounds
for black insurgent politics, to which I will now
turn.

Black insurgent politics in Philadelphia
If the emerging regime of antisocial security
saturates urban public space with surveillance
and security measures and techniques, these
efforts have been of limited effectiveness in
controlling black teen crowd action (Palmer
and Farr 2017). One reason for this is that the
very same surveillance technologies through
which synoptic power condenses into a form
of continuous control also enable new forms
of sociality and unrest that challenge race and
class hierarchies and the racialized control of
urban space. Comprised of people who reside
mostly in Philadelphia’s “outcast ghettos” (Marcuse 1998), they nonetheless are not contained
there and are mobile enough to come together
in commercial areas. And the threat that they
pose, and the reason therefore that they are so
often trivialized by the mainstream media and
by municipal elites as nonpolitical forms of
senseless social disruption, is that teen crowd
actions are, like riots, an expression of public space occupation and reclamation by black

youth who are widely viewed as inherently ungovernable, disorganized, and disruptive, and
hence without any legitimate right to inhabit urban public space on this scale. The political disruptions caused by black youth in Philadelphia
and other assertions of the right to occupy public space by those who are putatively referred
to as the “urban underclass” should thus not
be underestimated or discounted. What makes
these actions political is not just the disruption
itself. It is also their persistence. These actions
have occurred frequently, if sporadically, since
2009. They have not stopped despite widespread
condemnation by the municipal elite, including
prominent leaders in the city’s African American community. And they have not stopped despite a scaling up of surveillance and of policing
measures designed to stop them. These actions
are also politically disruptive because in many
instances participants engage in direct conflicts
with police officers, risking the violent reaction
that these kinds of encounters frequently entail.
There is also a clear political message that can
be discerned in what black teens themselves say
about “flash mobs.”11 Billy Penn, a web-based
news hub founded by a former Washington
Post web editor, published an extensive exposé
on flash mobs in Philadelphia. Cassie Owens
(2017), the author of the piece, interviewed several teens, who explained the participation of
their peers in “flash mobs”: “I think they’re trying to show off in front of people,” said one. “I
don’t know,” said another, “To get recognition.
They want to be cool.” By text, I asked a young
woman I know why she participated in several
“flash mobs” years ago when she lived in Philadelphia. “To get out and be seen,” she texted
back. These responses suggest a politics of visibility—of gaining recognition by being looked
at—that could be interpreted as an apolitical expression of youthful narcissism. But I speculate
that it is more than this. For many years, urban
African Americans have used technology to unsettle long-term patterns of surveillance and policing that helped to reshape the urban core, its
retail sector, its residential neighborhoods, and
its streets. The release of cell phone recordings
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of police brutality and murder inspired protests
across the country. The mainstream political
response to these protests, and to the scandal
of police misconduct and violence more generally, is the call for more body cameras for the
police. This response exemplifies precisely how
synoptic power extends itself into new domains.
Body cameras bring viewing and being viewed
into new domains. Though not entirely unprecedented as a police accountability measure, an
uncharted kind of viewing is being established
here, as the police record what they do for others to see. There is no doubt that a great deal
of magical thinking behind the idea that body
cameras will somehow create the kind of unambiguous “evidence” necessary to either prove the
police innocent or guilty of misconduct. As Judith Butler (1993) argued long ago about video
evidence from the Rodney King beating, different interpretations of video footage are possible
based on how the footage is framed for different
audiences, from liberal publics to juries that
are tasked with the narrow legal responsibility
to decide guilt or innocence to inner-city residents who live daily under the threat of police
violence. The point here is not so much whether
or not there is a preferable or “correct” reading
of cell phone footage of police conduct, or of
body camera footage. The point is that the questions “What is permissible? What is reasonable?
What is just?” are increasingly framed in terms
of “What looks permissible? What looks reasonable? What looks just?” The political and ethical
terrain is thus delimited more and more by the
practice of looking, and patterns of inequality will be reinforced or contested in terms set
by synoptic power. I think that young African
Americans are aware of this. Their desire to be
seen in urban public spaces where they are not
permitted to congregate en masse is a political
commentary of sorts. It is not just a refusal to be
contained in the outcast ghettos to which they
have been relegated. It is about the affirmative
power of being seen, of being both in the city
and of it. It is thus an insurgent expression of
urban citizenship, one that also has national
and global implications, as black youth circu-

late recordings of their crowd actions beyond
their local communities. Surprisingly, synopticism helps in this case to enable black insurgent
politics. And this case resonates as well with
the kind of insurgent politics that has been pioneered by Black Lives Matter in Philadelphia
and in other locations across the United States
and elsewhere. BLM has famously refused to
specify a list of concrete policy demands or
policing reforms. This is in line with a similar
refusal by OWS and by other insurgent groups.
Pundits from many quarters criticize this refusal as an indication of a lack of understanding
about “how politics really works.” Yet there is
another way to read this refusal: as an attempt to
defend black communities and neighborhoods
from violent, militarized intrusions by the security and surveillance apparatuses, an essential
task that many BLM activists see as a first step
in a larger process of the reclaiming the streets,
shops, and the city itself from the encompassing
web of an ever-encroaching antiblack social order. Indeed, BLM mobilizations are an assertion
of sovereignty for African American individuals and communities that unsettles simplistic
public and private divides and the liberal orthodoxies that promise better race relations via reformist attempts to fix the welfare state or other
pragmatic public policy solutions. More than
just protests against the coercive power of the
state (which presumably could be ameliorated
by better policies), they represent a powerful
critique of antiblackness, not just the racist and
discriminatory practices associated with one
branch of government or another, but of the
centrality of black impoverishment and social
and physical death to the white social order itself. In fact, the pervasiveness in different political quarters of the “all lives matter” or the “black
labs matter” retort to BLM is quite clearly an
attempt to make the protest against black social
and physical death into an expression of reverse
racism. And it is thus possible to see “all lives
matter” and other similar retorts as a form of revanchist politics that seeks to impose at the level
of culture and ideology color-blind racism by
masking white supremacy through the assertion
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of white victimhood at the hands of purportedly
entitled racial minorities. In both cases—“flash
mobs” and BLM—there is an interesting dialectic between seeing and being seen, looking
and being looked at, security and insecurity that
plays out in the battle over urban public space.
As a black political activist in Philadelphia explained to me, “If you take the slogan, ‘Black
Lives Matter’ at face value and even separate it
from the Movement for Black Lives, black teens
congregating in a downtown space outside of
their home turf is a way of expressing the same
thing—we matter, we exist, deal with us.”
This insurgent political sensibility is also
reshaping black politics in Philadelphia. For
the poorest African American Philadelphians,
very little has changed in the past four decades,
despite the political ascension of many black
elected officials and white liberal Democrats.
From the point of view of many African Americans, the Office of the District Attorney has
long been one of the most revanchist parts of
city government, the fear-mongering, corrupt,
and racist epicenter of the city’s law and order
political establishment that has gone out of its
way to criminalize black people to gain political favor with white voters. On 17 May 2017,
Larry Krasner won the Democratic primary.
Krasner was a defense attorney who has been
taking on civil rights cases for Black Lives Matter, Occupy Philadelphia, AIDS activists, and
protesters arrested at political conventions. He
ran a campaign against the death penalty and
against the DA’s office, which he described as “a
place with a mad zeal for the highest charge, for
the highest level of conviction, a culture that can
find no flaw in police misconduct, that is drunk
on the death penalty” (quoted in Brennan and
Terruso 2017). Krasner handily defeated six
other candidates in the primary, including Tariq
El-Shabazz, the only black candidate who was
a first assistant district attorney. Whereas Krasner, a white progressive, worked as a defense and
civil rights attorney and often defended African
Americans against malicious prosecution and
discriminatory policing practices, El-Shabazz

was personally recruited to run by the former
district attorney, who is under indictment for
corruption and who implemented no criminal
justice reforms during his two full terms in office. Members of Black Lives Matter supported
Krasner’s candidacy, as did Color of Change, a
national racial justice organization whose leadership saw the Philadelphia district attorney’s
race as ground zero for criminal justice reform
in the United States. Color for Change established a savvy social media–based Get Out the
Vote operation in support of Krasner. During
his campaign, Krasner vowed not to take cases
brought by precincts that engage in the regular
practice of stop-and-frisk, so Krasner gained
the endorsement of several prominent radical
black leaders. In the early 2000s and before, it
would have been impossible in Philadelphia for
a white politician running a radical platform
to gain a significant number of black votes for
district attorney. This suggests not only that a
sizable percentage of black Philadelphians are
united in opposition to current criminal justice
policies and are invested politically in reforming
the legal, surveillance, and policy apparatuses
in the city. It also indexes broad dissatisfaction
with the liberal urban political establishment,
including the black political establishment, on
the part of many African American Philadelphians. Furthermore, at a moment when the liberal urban political establishment is frequently
celebrated at the national level as the cosmopolitan antidote to Trumpism, developments such
as the political ascension of Larry Krasner point
to a more complicated political situation, with
class and race politics in major metropolitan
areas working to unsettle the liberal cosmopolitanism versus white nationalist Trumpism
political logic that tends to undergird popular
accounts of US politics. Indeed, careful attention to dynamics such as these reveals that large
swathes of the urban electorate are dissatisfied
with both options and that they assert their
right to the city that contradicts the imperatives
of austerity urbanism when they find the opportunity to do so.
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Conclusion: Antisocial security
and the fate of the commons
In organizing this article around the theme of
surveillance, I hope to encourage an analytical
move beyond a simplistic domination/resistance
paradigm to explore a new regime of antisocial
security. The emphasis here is on the antisocial,
individualizing ways that social groups and
communities are carved up and how individuals and groups are singled out, labeled as pariahs, and disciplined in new and unexpected
ways. This regime will create new modes of racial inequality and class division while it reinforces extant patterns. This is thus the regime to
which black insurgent movements are learning
to respond.
The conceptual and political promise of
the concept of black insurgent politics lies in
its power to push beyond the class universalism of the white Left in the United States to
help us to think through what kinds of social
arrangements might adhere in a society that is
not invested foundationally in black social and
physical death. It pushes us to go beyond questions around what an anticapitalist commons
might look like or what prefigurative politics
should look like today to ask what an antiracist commons might look like. Indeed, there is
no doubt that many of the commoning politics
projects that exist today, or that have existed
in the recent past, in the urban United States,
have been exclusionary in ways that harm black
urbanites. Proponents of the commons concept therefore need to address race explicitly in
their elaboration of equality, justice and collective stewardship (see, e.g., Harney and Moten
2013). It is certainly possible to prioritize efforts
to establish forms of sociality, community, production, cooperation, and resource stewardship
and use that do not collude with racist logics
and practices, are not indifferent to black social
and political death, and do not imperil black
lives as an essential feature of their organization. Although it is possible to imagine doing
this alongside and to a certain extent in cooperation with the struggle to build anticapitalist

commons, we should not assume that these two
struggles are natural allies or that one should always be categorically subordinated to the other.
At the same time, we should not presume that
antiracist commoning will or should necessarily be anticapitalist; nor can we assume that
anticapitalist commoning will or should be antiracist, though both efforts, and many others,
are vital means for working toward a nonracist,
noncapitalist world.
I wish to end with an additional comment on
the adequacy of the commons as an emancipatory rubric given the implications of antisocial
security. If modulation, not enclosure, is the new
means through which power will operate in the
world today, then commoning must address the
many dangers of a society of continuous control.
Are the refusals by teen crowds, BLM and Philadelphia voters to follow the scripts provided by
past movements and politics an attempt to resist
enclosure and to reclaim public space and resources in order to build commons, or are they
after something else, something as yet unnamed
that has less do to with establishing a common
will and more to do with a form of political action that can move rapidly from place to place,
from person to person, group to group, to protect vulnerable and precarious people from the
harsh, arbitrary and unjust gazes to which they
are subjected?
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Notes
1. The labeling of African American teen gatherings as “flash mobs” has also happened in
Chicago and St. Louis, at the Wisconsin State
Fair, and in other major metropolitan areas in
the United States. For an excellent critical discussion of this labeling and its implications for
post-9/11 antiterrorist securitization in Philadelphia, see Massaro and Mullaney (2011).
2. Media reporting on “black flash mobs” is somewhat variable, reflecting the highly partisan and
polarized political cultures represented in the
increasingly fragmented US public sphere (Di
Leonardo 1998). Since 2010, most mainstream
media coverage of “black flash mobs” in Philadelphia emphasize the criminal conduct of
the perpetrators and the violence or injuries
that they cause, but they tend not to comment
explicitly on race. In contrast, the right-wing
media tends to describe the activities of black
youth as racially motivated. For example, one
Daily Wire article complained that the mainstream media would not describe a “teen mob
attack” on a bystander as an antiwhite hate
crime (Bandler 2016).
3. I conducted two years of full-time ethnographic
research focusing on the civic activities of residents in a gentrifying neighborhood of Philadelphia (2000–2002), after completing my
dissertation focused on other arenas of urban
activism (Maskovsky 2000). I returned to Philadelphia frequently from 2002 to 2017 and stayed
in touch with informants who were involved in
urban activism. My fieldwork research relied
principally on three ethnographic methods: participant observation, open-ended interviews,
and an in-depth life-history collection. I studied
a wide array of activities involving urban activ-

4.

5.

6.

7.

ists and neighborhood residents as they volunteered in nonprofit and church-based soup
kitchens, recovery programs, and job-training
programs and as they organized around “quality
of life” issues such as trash removal, the maintenance and upkeep of abandoned lots, and the
construction of affordable housing. I collected
data on the strategies and tactics residents used
to distribute resources, access services, and attract investment and paid close attention to how
residents negotiate with each other, with city officials, and with representatives from the corporate sector. My interview data provided insights
into the contested terrain of community life, as
residents revealed varied, often contradictory,
visions of racial justice, community development, resource mobilization, and neighborhood
belonging. I also interviewed public officials,
developers, policy makers, consultants, professional staff from nonprofit organizations, and
civic leaders. My life histories provided insights
into activist trajectories, showing how personal
histories of political involvement became a resource for contemporary political action. In my
field research, I paid close attention to the ways
in which race, class, and gender shaped civic action and was careful to collect data across these
axes of difference.
For recent accounts of policing and securitization in Philadelphia, see Maskovsky (2006);
Massaro and Mullaney (2011); and Ruben and
Maskovsky (2008); the link of moral panics, policing, race and class politics, and authoritarian
populism is made by Hall (1978) in the classic
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law
and Order.
See Ruben and Maskovsky (2008) for a parallel
discussion of homeland securitization in Philadelphia; see Katz (2007) on banal terrorism and
the performance of security in urban space.
The argument I develop here is inspired in large
measure by Roger Lancaster’s (2017) brilliant
new piece, “The New Pariahs: Sex, Crime and
Punishment in America.” I extend his argument
in a different direction by emphasizing the continuing significance of race and racism via the
extension of synoptic power into new urban
spaces.
To a certain extent, the argument I am making
here follows Nikolas Rose’s (1996) argument
about the “death of the social” as a key zone,
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target, and objective of government under conditions of globalization (for a critique of this
position, see Clarke 2004). My emphasis, however, is not on the widespread reimagining and
rescaling of governing practices down to the
level of “community,” as Rose argues, but rather
the narrow advent of a mobile and plural form
of surveillance, enacted more through synoptic
than panoptic power, that is invested in policing
across disciplinary regimes such as the family,
neighborhood, community, school, and public
health apparatuses. Calling the kind of security
that is imagined, if not fully obtained through
these maneuvers, antisocial is meant to mark
both the abandonment of social cohesion and
social justice as the governmental logic of urban surveillance regimes and the simultaneous
establishment of surveillance procedures and
programs at various scales that cut across conventional spatialized strategies of government.
8. The term “neoliberalism” has been useful in the
past in capturing key governing dynamics that
have emerged in conjunction with the globalization of the world economy since the 1980s.
But recently, what is meant by the term has become so imprecise that I wonder if it has lost
most of its explanatory power (see Kingfisher
and Maskovsky 2008; Maskovsky and Brash
2013).
9. Incomes for middle-income whites have been
flat for more than three decades even if their
economic situation remains better, on the
whole, than that of blacks or Latinxs, especially
after the 2008 economic collapse. Elite women
have made employment inroads over the past
three decades, but lower-income women have
not (Massey 2009). Six out of ten poor adults
are women, and six in ten poor children live in
households headed by women.
10. For Sassen, financiers and the managerial
classes across the world may engage in similar
kinds of brutal operations through which they
savagely “sort” who will matter and who will
be counted in the new metrics of productivity,
profitability, and growth on the one hand and
who will be pushed to live (or die) at what Sassen calls the “systematic edge.” But, for Sassen,
elites and experts are not necessarily united in
a concerted effort to expropriate and dispossess,
for the complexity of the system makes it difficult for them to see clearly the consequences

of their actions: mass foreclosures, land grabs
and displacement, forced migration, economic
collapse, and environmental destruction on a
global scale.
11. From January to May 2017, I attempted to
contact several teens whom my activist informants or I knew had participated in a turbulent
crowd action. One responded to me, by text, in
mid-February 2017.
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